(1) JD Vance本周末(2026/4/11-4/12)在巴基斯坦與伊朗的會談沒有達成協議，伊朗不願意棄核。
(2) 美國海軍(4/11)開始穿越，並清理荷姆茲海峽的水雷，但根據專家的看法，應該是要至少數周的工作，而非短期能完成。(3) 川普發文(2026/4/12)表示美國也要封鎖海峽，跟之前為了穩定油價，讓伊朗油船通過的態度出現改變，應該也是急了，把壓力丟回去給伊朗，以及給中共(伊朗石油進口國)誘因去讓伊朗退讓?
(4) 對油價跟經濟的影響? 可以參考高盛2026/3/20(文章日期)發布的Top of Mind，列出三個情境：
(5) 樂觀情境，荷姆茲海峽從3/21後開始逐步恢復，油價2026Q4約在 USD 71/barrel，這個情境顯然已經不可能，截至2026/4/12，海峽的航運都尚未開始明顯回復。
In a (most optimistic) first scenario where flows through the Strait of Hormuz gradually recover from here and return to pre-war levels within a month, we would expect prices to average $71/bbl in 4Q2026. This supply shock would translate into a 6% (617mb) hit to global commercial oil inventories. The release of strategic petroleum reserves (SPR) by IEA member states and China, as well as the uptake of Russian oil on water, would likely offset 50% of the hit, translating into $6/bbl upside to fair value prices. We assume positioning would provide an additional $3/bbl boost, bringing our estimate of 4Q2026 price upside to $9/bbl.
(6) 中性情境，海峽的運輸被影響到2026/4/28，則油價在2026Q4大概是 USD 93/barrel。看起來是還能期待的一個情境? 美伊上周(4/8)談成的14天停火期限是到2026/4/22左右，美軍也同時開始清理水雷，站在這個時間點(4/12)，這個中性情境應該尚有一定可能達成。
In a second scenario where flows remain disrupted for 60 days (through April 28th), we think 4Q2026 prices would average $93/bbl, as the supply shock would lead to a significantly larger nearly 20% (1816mb) hit to global commercial oil inventories. Even with increased releases of global SPR (although constrained by logistical speed limits) and Russian oil on water, policy responses would likely only offset about 30% of the hit, translating into upside of $26/bbl. Combined with an additional $5/bbl boost from positioning, we estimate 4Q2026 price upside at $31/bbl.
(7) 悲觀情境，海峽的運輸被影響到2026/4/28，而且中東產能在復航後仍有2mb/d(200萬桶石油/每天)的缺口，對海峽通航的假設情境跟中性情境一樣，但額外考量的中東產能長期的一定程度下降，這個情境則是預估到2027Q4油價都還有USD 110/barrel這麼貴。
Finally, in a third, more extreme scenario where Hormuz flows remain very low for 60 days and significant scarring to long-run supply occurs (specifically, that Middle Eastern production remains 2mb/d lower after the Strait opens), we estimate that prices would reach about $110/bbl in 4Q2027, consisting of over $40/bbl of upside relative to a no-Iran shock counterfactual of roughly $70/bbl.
(8) 高盛這篇報告還分析了伊朗戰爭對石油供需的長期影響，供給端的風險是戰後(復航後)因為(A)石油基礎設施在戰爭損毀，以及(B)較低的投資，及(C)25%的中東石油產能是離岸產能，較費時復原原本的產出率，導致供給無法完全回復戰前水準。文章也舉2022俄烏戰爭、2011利比亞戰爭、兩伊戰爭、兩次波灣戰爭(1990與2003)為案例，歷史上油國戰爭，產能在數年內都無法復原到原本的水準。
We also consider four risks to long-term oil prices—two on the supply side and two on the demand side.
On the supply side, the primary long-term risk to prices is the potential for oil supply to remain low for longer if production potential is damaged, which would pose upside price risk. The five prior largest supply shocks (Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War I, Gulf War II, Libyan Civil War, and Russian invasion of Ukraine) suggest that production four years after the shock remains over 40% below normal levels, largely driven by damage to oil infrastructure and low investment. This risk could be particularly significant to today's shock given that Iran and the seven other Persian Gulf countries collectively produced 30% of the world's crude oil in 2025. Additionally, roughly 25% of the region's crude oil is produced offshore, where engineering and geological complexity requires significantly longer ramp-up times than for onshore production.
(9) 長期需求端的話則是兩種因子都有，戰後SPR的重建以及設定較高庫存天數會導致需求上升；而石油效率提升或替代能源則會減低需求。但該報告總結是認為upside risk在長期與短期都是較大。
On the demand side, faster strategic stock building from 2027 on low end-2026 reserves and higher SPR targets in response to lingering uncertainty would pose an upside risk to prices. But slowing demand should high prices accelerate fuel efficiency gains and shifts to other fuels, or the energy shock weigh meaningfully on GDP growth, would pressure prices in the other direction.
On net, we think risks to oil prices are skewed to the upside in the short term and over the longer term. The persistence of several prior large supply shocks underscores the risk that oil prices may stay above $100/bbl for longer in risk scenarios with lengthier disruptions and large persistent supply losses.
(10) 在這篇報告發布(3/20)後，其實還有不少中東(或全球其他產油國)石油產能或基礎設施遭到攻擊新聞，例如Saudi 的東西向油管被攻擊(4/8)，烏克蘭攻擊俄羅斯在波羅的海的石油出口設施(3/29)，科威特海水淡化廠被攻擊(3/30)，澳洲的LNG工廠被熱帶氣旋 Narelle 損壞(3/27)等。因此，實際情況應該是會比報告中的中性情境嚴重，靠近悲觀情境。
(11) 在一切都配合的很好的順利情況，海峽應該也要4月底5月初才可能逐步恢復通航，(雖然在川普發文封鎖海峽後，Polymarket的5月底開航機率又往下掉)，
來源：Polymarket
所以，再怎麼樂觀，至少也要以高盛報告的中性情境作為基準，USD 90/bbl以上的高油價在今年應該會是常態。
(12) 中東的石油在煉油廠產出Jet Fuel與柴油的轉換率優於美國的頁岩油，亞太與第一島鏈國家煉油廠長期以來都是吃中東石油居多，如果改吃美國頁岩油，轉換率其實是減少，也算是Jet Fuel與柴油的供給線左移長期因子，另外，美國頁岩油到亞太的距離遠很多，VLCC大型油輪無法通過巴拿馬運河，都要繞過南非好望角，又是一個長期影響石油供給的因子。
(13) 卡達最大天然氣出口設施被攻擊，損失17%的LNG年產能，CEO說要3-5年才能恢復，天然氣的部分對於歐洲可能是個風險，歐洲的天然氣庫存在2026年竟然又跟2022年類似，是近年的庫存偏低的位置，
來源：財經M平方
冬天之前還感受不到，年底冬天就不知道會發生甚麼事，歐洲跟亞太都要搶美國天然氣LNG?
(14) 至少看到今年夏天，耗油的產業：航空公司、郵輪、貨運航運、產能填不滿的亞太煉油廠可能壓力都會不小；產能滿載的美國煉油廠、美國頁岩油商、南美油商等，至少到夏天用油旺季之前應該都會不錯。
